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ABSTRACT
Recent research has demonstrated that adding some imperceptible
perturbations to original images can fool deep learning models. How-
ever, the current adversarial perturbations are usually shown in the
form of noises, and thus have no practical meaning. Image water-
mark is a technique widely used for copyright protection. We can
regard image watermark as a king of meaningful noises and adding
it to the original image will not affect people’s understanding of the
image content, and will not arouse people’s suspicion. Therefore,
it will be interesting to generate adversarial examples using water-
marks. In this paper, we propose a novel watermark perturbation for
adversarial examples (Adv-watermark) which combines image wa-
termarking techniques and adversarial example algorithms. Adding
a meaningful watermark to the clean images can attack the DNN
models. Specifically, we propose a novel optimization algorithm,
which is called Basin Hopping Evolution (BHE), to generate adver-
sarial watermarks in the black-box attack mode. Thanks to the BHE,
Adv-watermark only requires a few queries from the threat models
to finish the attacks. A series of experiments conducted on ImageNet
and CASIA-WebFace datasets show that the proposed method can
efficiently generate adversarial examples, and outperforms the state-
of-the-art attack methods. Moreover, Adv-watermark is more robust
against image transformation defense methods.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Image recognition and understand-
ing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent literature has found that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
are vulnerable to the adversarial examples which are generated by
adding some imperceptible noises to the clean images [5]. Generally
speaking, attack methods can be divided into two categories: white-
box attack methods and black-box attack methods. The white-box
attack [2, 6, 15, 23] denotes that the attacker has complete access
to the target model such as model parameters, model structure, etc.
And the black-box attack [1, 4, 29, 33] denotes that the attacker
can only access the output of the target model. The above methods
achieve attacks by generating imperceptible perturbations. They use
L0,L2,L∞ to bound the noises. Recently, more and more researchers
pay attention to generating realistic adversarial examples without
the Lp norm limitation. For example, a semantic-based perturbation
(SemanticAdv) is proposed in [26]. It generates an unrestricted ad-
versarial example by manipulating the semantic attributes of images.
In [16], Lagae et al. propose to generate adversarial examples by
using procedural noise functions which are widely used in computer
graphics. And in [4], Engstrom et al. use the chosen rotations and
translations to generate the adversarial examples. Compared with
the adversarial examples under Lp norm constraint, the unrestricted
adversarial examples are more realistic and practical. Following up
the unrestricted attack methods, we propose a novel attack method
which uses the meaningful perturbations to generate adversarial
examples in this paper.
Watermarking methods [7] play an important role in protecting
intellectual property rights. It embeds some specific information of
the copyright holder (such as university logos, ownership descrip-
tions, etc) into the multimedia data according to the requirements of
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Figure 1: Adversarial examples with watermark perturbations.
The original class labels are in black text and the adversarial
class labels are in red text.
users. With the digital libraries, the research of visible watermark is
becoming more and more important. In [20], Mintzer et al. describe
the characteristics of visible watermarks. The visible watermark
should be visible but does not significantly obscure the details of the
host image. In [21], the IBM digital library organization proposes to
use a visible watermark to mark the digitized pages of the Vatican
archive manuscript.
In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial attack which gener-
ates adversarial examples using watermarks. We find that although
watermarks do not affect people’s understanding of the image con-
tent, and adding specific watermarks to the clean images can fool
the DNN models. The specific watermarks refer to the specific po-
sition and transparency of them. We mainly consider using visible
watermarks to generate adversarial examples. In detail, we use alpha
blending [31] to achieve watermark embedding. The host image and
the watermark are multiplied by a scaling factor. The scaling factor
is manipulated in the α channel of the image, which decides the
image’s transparency.
As for a certain watermark, the DNN models can be successfully
attacked only by adding the watermark with the specific transparency
to a specific position of the host image. Considering this, we propose
a novel attack method to generate watermark adversarial perturba-
tions based on the optimization algorithms. Specifically, we propose
a Basin Hopping Evolution (BHE) algorithm to find the appropriate
transparency of the watermark image and the appropriate position
within the host image to embed watermark. BHE is proposed based
on the Hopping Evolution (BH) [36], where we find it usually falls
into a local optimum and fails in attacking DNN models. In contrast,
BHE has multiple initial starting points and crossover operation to
keep the diversity of solutions. In this way, BHE makes it easier
to find a global optimal solution and thus achieves a higher attack
success rate than BH. The proposed method achieves attacks by
using a little information (predicted probability of the classification
model). It does not need the inner information of DNNs such as
Figure 2: In this paper, we explore two kinds of media as the
watermark: logos and texts. The top row uses university logo
watermarks. The middle row uses the official logo of ACMMM.
The bottom row is text watermarks of ACMMM with different
colors. These nine host images are randomly selected from Im-
ageNet.
network structures and weights, and can attack many types of DNNs
even if the gradient of the network is difficult to calculate. Therefore,
it belongs to the black-box attack.
Besides the ability to perform adversarial attacks, Adv-watermark
also inherits the function of the visible watermark. That’s to say,
Adv-watermark can also protect the copyright of the image because
it carries the owner’s description. Therefore, Adv-watermark can
accomplish two functions at the same time. This is a major advantage
compared with the previous research. In this paper, we explore two
kinds of media as the watermarks: logos and texts. Figure 2 lists the
used watermarks, and some generated Adv-watermark examples are
shown in Figure 1.
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
1) We propose the Adv-watermark, a novel watermark perturba-
tion for adversarial examples, which combines image watermarking
techniques and adversarial example algorithms. Compared with the
previous works, the proposed adversarial example is more realistic
and effective. The Adv-watermark has the watermark characteristic
(copyright protection) and adversarial example function (fool the
well-trained classifier) at the same time.
2) We propose a novel optimization algorithm, which is called
Basin Hopping Evolution (BHE), to generate adversarial examples
efficiently. The proposed method adopts a population-based global
search strategy to generate adversarial examples, and can achieve
high performance in attacking DNN models.
3) Compared with the previous black-box attack methods, the
proposed method can achieve a higher attack success rate. In detail,
it can achieve an above 97% black-box attack success rate when the
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watermark size is 4/9 of the host image size. Even if the watermark
size is 1/16 of the host image size, it also can achieve an about 65%
attack success rate. Moreover, it is difficult to defend the proposed at-
tack method using the state-of-the-art image transformation defense
methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the related work. Section 3 introduces the details of
the proposed Adv-watermark. Section 4 shows a series of experi-
mental results and analysis. Finally, Section 5 gives the conclusion.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we investigate the attack methods and the visible
watermarking methods.
2.1 Attack methods
In [6], Goodfellow et al. devise an effective method to calculate the
adversarial examples, and the adversarial perturbation is generated
according to the direction of the gradient change of the DNNs. This
method is also called FGSM. Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) [15] is
an improved version of FGSM. I-FGSM constructs an adversarial
example by multi-step and smaller movements, which greatly im-
proves the success rate of the attack. The most common adversarial
attack methods are under the L∞ and L2 distance metric. But in
[24], Papernot et al. propose to build adversarial saliency maps to
generate adversarial examples under L0 norm. Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. propose a simple and accurate method (Deepfool) [23] to effi-
ciently generate the adversarial examples. Moreover, they further
propose the universal perturbation based on Deepfool in [22]. And
in [2], Carlini and Wagner propose three attack methods to attack
defensive distillation Networks [25]. In [33], Su at el. propose to
generate one-pixel adversarial perturbations based on differential
evolution (DE). That is, only one pixel can be changed to generate
an adversarial example, which is an extreme attack method.
2.2 Visible watermarking methods
In [13], Kankanhalli et al. propose a visible watermarking technique
that can find the strength of the watermark image and the location of
the host image to embed watermark automatically in the DCT do-
main. In [31], Shen et al. propose to use the alpha blending technique
to generate the visible watermark. A removable visible watermark
is proposed in [9]. They design a vision watermarking algorithm
suitable for the different requirements of the applications. In [18],
Liu et at. propose a new approach to generate a generic lossless
visible watermark. The proposed method makes use of deterministic
one-to-one mappings of image pixel values to achieve generating the
visible watermark. In [10], Huang et al. design a visible watermark-
ing algorithm for digital right management. A contrast-sensitive
function and block classification are used to achieve a better visual
effect in the discrete wavelet transform domain.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we introduce the proposed method from three aspects:
visible watermarking, problem formulation and problem solving.
3.1 Visible Watermarking
We use alpha blending in [31] to generate a visible watermark. Alpha
channel(α channel) refers to the transparency of a foreground region
w.r.t. the background image. In this paper, we use α to represent the
value of the alpha channel, H to represent the host image whose size
is N ×M ,W to represent the watermark image whose size is n ×m
andG to represent the generated image with a watermark whose size
is N ×M . When i ∈ (p,p + n), j ∈ (q,q +m), the generation for G is
formulated as:
v(G)i, j = (v(W )i−p, j−q ∗ α +v(H )i, j ∗ (255 − α))/255 (1)
when i < (p,p + n), j < (q,q +m), G is formulated as:
v(G)i, j = v(H )i, j , (2)
where v(x) denotes the image x , the subscript i, j of v(x) represent
the pixel position, and p,q represent the position where the water-
mark image is embedded. In this paper, we not only use the image
watermark, but also use the text watermark. We first convert the text
into an image and then process it. As for the image watermark, we
use UC Berkeley, CMU, MIT, Cambridge and Stanford University
logo watermarks. Simultaneously, we also use the official ACMMM
logo from 2016 to 2020. As for text watermark, we use red, green,
blue, black and gray fonts to generate adversarial examples. We also
synthesize watermark images in different sizes to explore scale-ware
effects. It is formulated as:
η = min((Wh ∗ sl)/Ww , (Hh ∗ sl)/Hw ),
Wsw =Ww ∗ η,Hsw = Hw ∗ η, (3)
whereWh and Hh represent the width and height of the host image.
Ww and Hw represent the width and height of the watermark image.
sl is the scaling factor. AndWsw and Hsw represent the width and
height of the scaled watermark image. Note that in this paper, we
focus on the position and transparency of the watermark, not the
rotation, etc.
3.2 Problem Formulation
We disguise adversarial noise as a visible watermark to achieve
stealthiness. And the generation of adversarial examples is only
related to the position and transparency of the watermark. Generating
adversarial watermark images can be formalized as an optimization
problem with constraints. The host image is assumed as H , the
well-trained classification model is assumed as f and the correct
classification class of H is t . ft (H ) is the probability of H belonging
to the class t . Simultaneously, let W be the watermark image and
д(H ,W ,p,q,α) be the visible watermark algorithm. It embeds the
watermark imageW in the position (p,q) of the host image H . The p,
q and α are dependent onW , H , f . And the limitation of maximum
transparency of the watermark is L. In the case of untargeted attacks,
the goal of generation of adversarial examples can be transformed
into finding the optimized solution e(p,q,α)∗. It is formulated as:
minimize
e(p,q,α )∗
ft (д(H ,W ,p,q,α))
subject to α ≤ L
(4)
This problem involves two values: 1) the position (p,q) of the
watermark in the host image and 2) the transparency α of the water-
mark. Embedding the adversarial watermark which can be regarded
as a practical perturbation into the host image modifies the local
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Figure 3: The top row is the original images (they are correctly classified by Resnet101) and their corresponding heat-maps (generated
by Grad-CAM algorithm).The bottom row is the adversarial images with the visible watermark and their corresponding heat-maps.
The image classification labels are in black color.
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Figure 4: The process of Basin Hopping Evolution.
information of the host image. In this way, the adversarial watermark
perturbation permits a clean image to be an adversarial example.
Without affecting the visual effect of the image, the adversarial wa-
termark disturbs the important local regions which determine the
image classification to attack the well-trained classification model.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. From the heat-maps which are gener-
ated by Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM)
[30], it is clear why the Resnet101 predicts the input images as the
corresponding correct classes. And embedding the adversarial wa-
termark into the image can modify the distribution of the maximum
points on the generated heat-map.
3.3 Problem Solving
We propose a novel optimization algorithm, which is called Basin
Hopping Evolution(BHE). The proposed method is a heuristic ran-
dom search algorithm based on Basin Hopping, which can be used
for finding the global minimum of a multivariate function. As shown
in Figure 4, BHE includes Basin Hopping, crossover and selection
operations. During each iteration, the current solutions (parents)
use BH to produce a set of better solutions and conduct crossover
operation to generate a new set of candidate solutions (children).
And then in selection operation, compared with the corresponding
parents to conduct, if the children are more suitable for the current
population evolution (posses the smaller multivariate function value),
they survive and are passed to the next generation.
3.3.1 Population Initialization. BHE is an optimization algo-
rithm based on group evolution. We regard each solution as an
Figure 5: The histogram of the top 5 category confidence of gen-
erated images in the generation process of the adversarial ex-
amples using BHE.
individual of a population. And the elements (p,q and α) are con-
sidered as its genes. Let Xi,д denote the i-th individual in the д-th
generation population. And Xi,д, j (j = 0, 1, 2) denotes the j-th gene
of Xi,д . Therefore, we initialize a population as follows:
Xi,0, j = Xmin, j + rand(0, 1) · (Xmax, j − Xmin, j ), j = 0, 1, 2 (5)
where Xi,0, j is the j-th gene of the i-th individual in the initial
population , Xmin, j is the minimum of the j-th gene and Xmax, j is
the maximum of the j-th gene.
3.3.2 Basin Hopping. Basin Hopping (BH) is a stochastic op-
timization algorithm. During each iteration, BH generates some
new coordinates with random perturbations, next finds the local
minimization, and finally accepts or rejects the new coordinates
according to the minimized function value. We use BH to evolve a
better individual Vi,д from Xi,д .
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In detail, ft (д(H ,W ,p,q,α)) is assumed as ft (·). Starting with
Xi,д , a local optimal solution Vi,д of the function ft (·) is found by
using a minimization method L(·). Next we start the global search
iterations and use µд(Xi,д) to represent the global neighborhood of
Xi,д . It is formulated as:
µд(Xi,д) = [Xi,д ,Xi,д + r ∗ ®d], (6)
where ®d is an n-dimensional Gaussian(0, 1) variable and r is a fixed
step size. A new starting point is selected from the global neighbor-
hood of Vi,д . It is stored as Vi,д .It is formulated as:
Vi,д = G(µд(Vi,д)) (7)
And then starting with Vi,д , a local search is performed and the
result is stored as Si,д . Finally, we use a function Accept(Vi,д , Si,д)
to choose Vi,д or Si,д . And it is formulated as:
Accept(Vi,д , Si,д) =
{
1 ft (Si,д) ≤ ft (Vi,д)
0 ft (Si,д) > ft (Vi,д)
(8)
The detail description is given in Algorithm 1. To represent BH
algorithm simplify, it can be formulated as:
Vi,д = BH (Xi,д , I ), (9)
where Xi,д represents the i-th solution in the д-th generation popu-
lation, Vi,д represents the corresponding better solution using BH,
BH (·) represents the BH algorithm and I indicates the maximum
number of Basin Hopping iterations which is a super parameter
which we use a large number of experiments to certify.
Algorithm 1 BH algorithm
Require: The watermark image W , the host image H , the well-
trained classifier f and Xi,д
Ensure: Vi,д
1: Vi,д = L(ft (·),Xi,д);
2: repeat
3: Vi,д = G(µд(Vi,д));
4: Si,д = L(ft (·),Vi,д);
5: if Accept(Vi,д , Si,д) then
6: Vi,д = Si,д ;
7: end if
8: until global stopping rule is satisfied
9: return Vi,д
3.3.3 Crossover. As for the current solution (parents) Xi,д and
the corresponding BH optimization solutionVi,д , we conduct crossover
operation to get a candidate solution (child) Ui,д . It is formulated as:
Ui,д, j =
{
Vi,д, j , rand(0, 1) ≤ CR
Xi,д, j , others
(10)
where Ui,д, j is the j-th gene of Ui,д , Vi,д, j is the j-th gene of Vi,д ,
Xi,д, j is the j-th gene of Xi,д and CR is the crossover probability
which represents the degree of information exchange in the popula-
tion evolution. It is a super parameter which we use a large number
of experiments to certify.
3.3.4 Selection. We adopt a greedy selection strategy to select a
better solution as the next generation solution. It is formulated as:
Xi,д+1 =
{
Ui,д , ft
(
Ui,д
) ≤ ft (Xi,д )
Xi,д others
(11)
The detail description of BHE is given in Algorithm 2. And the
generation process of the adversarial examples by using BHE is
shown in Figure 5.
Algorithm 2 BHE algorithm
Require: Population: M; Dimension: 3; Generation: N ; Iteration:
I ;
Ensure: The best solution -△
1: д ← 0;
2: for i = 1 to M do
3: for j = 1 to 3 do
4: Xi,0, j = Xmin, j + rand(0, 1) · (Xmax, j − Xmin, j )
5: end for
6: end for
7: while ft (△) ≥ ε and д ≤ N do
8: for i = 1 to M do
9: ▶ Basin Hopping
10: Vi,д = BH (Xi,д , I )
11: ▶ Crossover
12: for j = 1 to 3 do
13: Ui,д, j = Crossover (Vi,д, j ,Xi,д, j )
14: end for
15: ▶ Selection
16: if ft (Ui,д) ≤ ft (Xi,д) then
17: Xi,д = Ui,д
18: if ft (Xi,д) ≤ ft (△) then
19: △ = Xi,д
20: end if
21: else
22: Xi,д = Xi,д
23: end if
24: end for
25: д ← д + 1
26: end while
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Experiment Settings
We conduct experiments based on ImageNet [28]and CASIA-WebFace
[37]. In detail, we randomly select 1,000 images from them to con-
duct the related experiments. We choose six classification mod-
els with different structures which are widely used in the litera-
ture as threat models: Alexnet [14], VGG19 [32], SqueezeNet[11],
Resnet101 [8], InceptionV1 [34] and InceptionV3 [35]. We also
compare with other black-box attack methods to verify the proposed
method: spatial attack [4], boundary attack [1], single-pixel attack
[33] and pointwise attack[29]. As for these attack methods, we adopt
their benchmark approaches and default parameters as recommended
in Foolbox [27].
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Table 1: Selection of hyper-parameters in BHE
I = 1 I = 2 I = 3 I = 4 I = 5 I = 6 Average
CR=0.5 56.8% 59.3% 58.1% 58.1% 60.0% 58.1% 58.4%
CR=0.6 56.2% 56.2% 57.5% 57.5% 59.3% 58.7% 57.6%
CR=0.7 56.8% 58.1% 58.7% 59.3% 59.3% 60.0% 58.7%
CR=0.8 56.8% 58.7% 56.8% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 58.7%
CR=0.9 58.1% 58.1% 60.0% 59.7% 59.3% 59.3% 58.9%
CR=1.0 57.5% 59.3% 59.3% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 59.3%
Average 57.0% 58.3% 58.4% 58.9% 59.6% 59.3% 58.6%
Table 2: The attack success rates of individual logo or text watermark.
ACMMM logo watermarks
Alexnet VGG19 SqueezeNet1_0 Resnet101 InceptionV3 Average
scale=2/3 88%/92% 77%/83% 85%/88% 78%/83% 77%/79% 81%/85%
scale=1/2 80%/88% 69%/80% 76%/82% 70%/78% 65%/74% 72%/80%
scale=1/3 68%/76% 54%/68% 56%/69% 56%/66% 51%/61% 57%/68%
scale=1/4 58%/69% 43%/59% 46%/62% 47%/58% 41%/52% 47%/60%
Average 74%/81% 61%/72% 66%/75% 63%/71% 59%/62% 65%/73%
University logo watermarks
Alexnet VGG19 SqueezeNet1_0 Resnet101 InceptionV3 Average
scale=2/3 96%/98% 96%/96% 95%/97% 96%/97% 96%/98% 96%/97%
scale=1/2 90%/95% 88%/90% 88%/91% 88%/90% 87%/91% 89%/92%
scale=1/3 78%/88% 74%/76% 73%/79% 72%/76% 68%/77% 73%/79%
scale=1/4 66%/78% 62%/66% 61%/71% 60%/66% 54%/63% 61%/69%
Average 83%/90% 80%/82% 80%/84% 79%/82% 76%/82% 80%/84%
Text watermarks
Alexnet VGG19 SqueezeNet1_0 Resnet101 InceptionV3 Average
font size=40 89%/91% 82%/81% 84%/85% 74%/76% 68%/73% 79%/81%
font size=36 85%/89% 79%/78% 80%/83% 69%/73% 63%/69% 75%/78%
font size=32 82%/85% 75%/76% 76%/80% 65%/69% 58%/65% 71%/75%
font size=28 75%/80% 70%/71% 71%/75% 59%/66% 53%/60% 66%/70%
Average 83%/86% 76%/76% 78%/81% 67%/71% 61%/66% 73%/76%
Table 3: The attack success rates with limit of embedded watermark position
scale=1/4 scale=1/5 scale=1/6 scale=1/7 scale=1/8
MIT logo 62% 58% 56% 55% 54%
ACMMM2020 63% 59% 58% 57% 53%
font size=22 font size=21 font size=20 font size=19 font size=18
Red text 61% 57% 55% 53% 50%
Table 4: Comparison with other attack methods
Network
attacker
Spatial Attack Boundary Attack Single-Pixel Pointwise Attack SU logo ACMMM2017 Blue text
Resnet101 52% 37% 5% 7% 88% 75% 73%
InceptionV3 58% 48% 5% - 87% 72% 67%
4.2 Optimization method implementation
The initial value of the step size r is set as 0.5. And the initial p,q and
α are set as 0, 0 and 100. The range of the p is [0,Wh −Wsw ]. The
range of the q is [0,Hh − Hsw ]. And the range of the α is [100, 200].
4.3 Selection of hyper-parameters
We conduct a large number of experiments to determine two hyper
parameters in BHE. One is the number of basin hopping iterations
I , the other one is crossover probability CR. We adopt BHE to
attack DNN models using ACMMM 2020 logo with scale=1/4. In
detail, we compute the attack success rates of the Resnet101 on 1000
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Table 5: Performance on the state-of-the-art image transformation defense methods
Network defender
attacker
Single-pixel Attack Boundary Attack CMU(1.5/2/3/4) ACMMM2020(1.5/2/3/4)
Resnet101
Jpeg defend 24% 13% 100%/98%/94%/92% 97%/95%/88%/83%
Comdefend 17% 13% 99%/94%/88%/82% 97%/94%/89%/82%
HGD 42% 34% 98%/95%/95%/94% 97%/95%/92%/90%
InceptionV3
Jpeg defend 42% 8% 100%/97%/94%/91% 99%/95%/90%/87%
Comdefend 34% 12% 99%/95%/91%/86% 98%/94%/90%/86%
HGD 32% 36% 98%/95%/89%/88% 95%/90%/86%/85%
random image of the ImageNet dataset. The result is shown in Table
1. From Table 1, it is clear that the attack success rate increases
when I increases. That is, as the number of Basin Hopping iterations
increases, the solution generated by BH will be better, resulting in
achieving a higher attack success rate. But more iterations mean
more time spent. Considering time complexity, we set CR to 0.9 and
I to 3. In this way, Adv-watermark can achieve the highest attack
success rate(60%). And in the original BH algorithm, the iteration I
is set to 450.
4.4 Attack performance
Six well-trained neural network models which include Alexnet,
VGG19, SqueezeNet, Resnet101, InceptionV1 and InceptionV3 are
used as threat models. In order to verify the proposed method com-
prehensively, we choose five university logo watermarks and five
official ACMMM watermarks as the image watermarks to generate
corresponding adversarial examples. And we also choose five dif-
ferent color fonts as the text watermarks to generate corresponding
adversarial examples. The average attack success rates of individual
logos or text watermarks are reported in Table 2. The first column
of each row shows the results of BH and the second column of each
row shows the results of BHE. It is clear that the proposed BHE
can achieve a high attack success rate. As for the university logo
watermarks, when the watermark size is set as 4/9 of the host image
size, the attack success rate can achieve about 97%. And when the
watermark size is set as1/16 of the host image size, the attack rate
also can achieve 69%. As for the ACMMM logo watermarks, the
average attack success rates of them drop a little. That is because
that the height-width ratio of the ACMMM watermark is not 1:1(the
height-width ratios of the ACMMM logo watermarks(2016-2020)
are 1 : 2.6, 1 : 2.5, 1 : 3, 1 : 2.1 and 1 : 2.6), and the size of the
ACMMM logo watermark is smaller than the university logo wa-
termark when the scale is the same. In detail, when scale=1/4, the
size of ACMMM2018 logo watermark is about 1/48 of the host
watermark size. Even though the performance of the adversarial
ACMMM logo watermarks declines a little, they also achieve a high
attack success rate. Especially, when the watermark size is 1/48 of
the host image size, the attack success rate can achieve about 50%.
Simultaneously, we use the text watermark to attack the well-trained
classification models. As shown in Table 2, the proposed method can
achieve about 86%, 76%, 81%, 71% and 66% average attack success
rates on Alexnet, VGG19, SqueezeNet, Resnet101 and InceptionV3
with different font sizes. Compared with BH, the proposed BHE can
achieve a higher attack success rate. Moreover, we conduct a series
of experiments on the CASIA-WebFace dataset within restricting
Table 6: Performance on the adversarial training
Adversarial
Training
MIT ACMMM20 Red Text
1/4 1/3 1/4 1/3 28 32
MIT(1/4) 50% 55% 74% 80% 91% 92%
ACMMM20(1/4) 78% 83% 43% 48% 85% 86%
Red Text(28) 71% 74% 72% 86% 44% 47%
(a) Position of Embedded Watermark
(b)  Adversarial Examples
Figure 6: (a) Limit of embedded watermark position. The face
is in the red rectangle and the embedded watermark is re-
stricted to the green rectangles. (b) Adversarial examples on the
CASIA-WebFace dataset.
adversarial watermark position. Specifically, as shown in Figure 6
(a), we use MTCNN [38] to find face area which is marked as the red
rectangle. We restrict the embedded watermark to the area on both
sides of the rectangle which is marked as the green rectangle. And
then we use Adv-watermark to attack InceptionV1 which is trained
on CASIA-WebFace dataset. Generated adversarial examples are
shown in Figure 6 (b). The attack result is shown in Table 3. Note
that since we limit the embedding area of the watermark, we should
adopt a smaller scale and font size. It is clear that even if we limit the
area of attack, the proposed attack method can also achieve excellent
performance.
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Figure 7: The adversarial examples with a variety of TV station
logos. The original class labels are in black color and the class
labels of the adversarial examples are in red color.
4.5 Comparisons with other attack methods
To quantitatively evaluate the proposed method performance, we
compare the proposed method with other black-box attack methods:
spatial attack [4], boundary attack [1], single-pixel attack [33] and
pointwise attack[29]. In detail, we choose the SU and ACMMM2017
image watermarks with different scales and blue font text watermark
with the different font sizes to complete the contrast experiments.
Their average attack success rates are shown in Table 4. As shown
in Table 4, it is clear that compared with other black-box attack
methods, our attack method can achieve a higher attack success rate.
In particular, the average attack success rate of SU reaches up to
88%.
In order to evaluate the robustness of the proposed method, we
compare the Adv-watermark with other black-box attack methods:
single-pixel attack and boundary attack, and choose three image
transformation defense methods: Jpeg defend [3], Comdefend [12]
and HGD [17]. We use the attack methods to attack the Resnet101
and InceptionV3 to generate corresponding adversarial examples,
next apply three defend methods to defend the adversarial examples
and then count their respective attack success rates. From Table 5,
it is clear that the existing image transformation defense methods
are useful for single-pixel attack and boundary attack, but not useful
for our proposed method. Compared with other attack methods,
the proposed method is more robust. We also conduct adversarial
training [19] to defend the proposed attack method. In detail, we
inject adversarial examples generated by MIT, ACMMM2020 image
watermark with scale = 1/4 and red text watermark with font = 28
into the original image dataset and retrain three Resnet101 on them
respectively. And then we use these watermarks with different sizes
to attack these models. The result is shown in Table 6. It is clear that
the adversarial training cannot effectively defend Adv-watermark.
Moreover, using another watermark to attack the adversarial training
model can achieve a higher attack success rate. In other words,
even though adversarial training increases the robustness to one
watermark perturbation, it increases the vulnerability to another
watermark perturbation.
Figure 8: Layer-wise perturbation levels of the VGG16 model.
Adversarial watermark and normal watermark added to clean
images correspond to the El , respectively.
4.6 Extension
The proposed method is not limited to using a watermark to generate
an adversarial example. It can be extended to use the TV station
logos to complete the attack. To make the generated adversarial
examples more realistic and imperceptible, we also choose more
commonly used TV station logos to complete the attack. In detail,
we select a variety of TV station logos, next limit the embedded
position of the logos to the upper right corner of the host image and
then use the proposed method to generate the adversarial examples.
As shown in Figure 7, the generated adversarial examples are more
realistic and common in the physical world.
4.7 Analysis for Adv-watermark
Compared with the previous attack methods, Adv-watermark pays
more attention to generate realistic adversarial examples. We find
DNN models are spatially vulnerable, which adding perturbations
at a specific position to clean images can attack them easily. This
makes it possible to attack DNN models by using watermarks. In
detail, DNN models can be attacked by adding specific transparency
watermarks to a specific position in clean images. To investigate
this characteristic, we conduct a comparative experiment to evalu-
ate layer-wise perturbations of the VGG16 model fed adversarial
watermark images and normal watermark images, respectively. The
difference between normal watermarks and adversarial watermarks
is that they are positioned differently on clean images. The perturba-
tion level in layer l can be formulated as:
El (xw ,x) = ∥ fl (xw ) − fl (x)∥2 /∥ fl (x)∥2 , (12)
where x represents a clean image, xw represents the clean image
with adversarial or normal watermark and fl (·) represents the l-th
layer of the VGG16 model.
The result is shown in Figure 8. The red curve represents the El
for adversarial watermark perturbations and the blue curve repre-
sents the El for normal watermark perturbations. Specifically, the
red curve is the average result on 30 randomly picked images with
the adversarial watermarks and the blue curve is the average result
on 30 same images with the normal watermarks. It is clear that the
watermark perturbation is progressively enlarged with the layer hier-
archy. But in the top layer, the adversarial watermark perturbation
Adv-watermark: A Novel Watermark Perturbation for Adversarial Examples ACMMM 2020, 12-16 October 2020 , Seattle, United States
is much higher than the normal watermark perturbation. Because
the classification result is dependent on the top-level features, the
adversarial watermark perturbation can fool DNN models but the
normal watermark perturbation can not. Moreover we find that the
pooling layer not only can remove the redundant image information
but also can reduce the impact of the watermark perturbation. But for
the adversarial watermark perturbation, the pooling layer does not
effectively reduce its impact. Note that even though the adversarial
watermark is not added to the recognized object, it can also attack
the DNN models successfully. Please refer to Figure 7.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discovered DNN models were spatially vulnerable,
which adding perturbations at a specific position to clean images
could attack models easily. And then we proposed a novel attacking
method which used the real watermark to attack the well-trained
classifier. Our adversarial perturbation was meaningful, which was
different from the traditional ones. We formulated the watermark
attack problem as a global optimization problem, and proposed a
novel optimization algorithm(BHE) to generate adversarial exam-
ples. Compared with the previous BH, BHE achieved a higher attack
success rate and was more efficient. In detail, generating an adver-
sarial example only needed to query the well-trained classification
model less than 1000 times. Moreover, the Adv-watermark was more
robust, because the state-of-the-art image transformation defense
methods could not defend the adversarial examples generated by
the proposed method. And the proposed method could be more
commonly used in the real world.
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